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REASON AND ACTION*
Charles Fried

WHAT I propose is the sketch of a complex theory. It is a way of looking
at human actions, a way which I believe removes some perplexities and illuminates others which moral agents face in making decisions, concrete decisions: personal, social, legal. I say this is a sketch because it necessarily
involves one deeply in matter of the sharpest philosophical controversy: action
and will, reason and action, desire, intention, and so on. At every step there
are many philosophical objections to be met, and a score of intricate arguments
to be argued. Yet I believe if philosophy is to be relevant to practical men,
then it must be possible to present at least the outline of the theory and carry
conviction as to its relevance. That, at any rate, is the task I have set myself,
and if I can succeed in it in some measure, then this is the best encouragement to the further task of battling out the details of the structure.

utilitarianism has been subject to powerful criticism from its
inception, and none more powerful than that of Kant, it has entered the
common educated consciousness as being at least prima facie the voice of
reason applied to questions of morals, of value, and therefore finally of legal
and legislative policy. It is, after all, a supremely generous, altruistic, and
seemingly objective doctrine. A group of related examples will show this:
in law, one of the few modem classics of legal scholarship and analysis,
Wechsler and Michael's "A Rationale of the Law of Homicide,"' which set
2
the way for the codification of a substantial part of the criminal law, explicitly adopts the utilitarian canon.
Applying this canon, the authors disapprove the decision of the Queens
ALTHOUGH
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In developing the ideas in this paper I should like to acknowledge the instruction and
assistance I have received from Professor John Rawls. My debt to him goes well beyond
the very considerable amount I have learned from his published writings. I have profited
also from conversations and from the opportunity of reading the notes of his lectures on
Kant and Hegel, delivered at Harvard University in 1963.
1 37 COLUmBiA LAw REVIEW 701 (pt. 1), 1261 (pt. 2) (1937).
2 1 refer to the American Law Institute's MODEL PENAL CODE, of which Professor

Wechsler was the Chief Reporter.
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Bench in the celebrated case of Regina v. Dudley and Stevens,3 in which
two sailors were convicted of the murder of a weak and dying cabin boy
whom they had killed and eaten after many days of drifting at sea in an open
boat following a shipwreck. The court in effect affirmed the principle that
the deliberate direct killing of an innocent person cannot be other than murder.
Wechsler and Michael point out that on many occasions an act which, as a
more or less remote consequence, has the effect of bringing about the death
of an innocent person, is praised or blamed depending on whether a net
saving of life was secured. The sealing off of a portion of a sinking ship,
trapping some but saving many more, is such an example. But if the only
distinction between such instances and Dudley and Stevens is that in the
latter the actors directly cause and desire as their means the death of innocent persons, this seems to the authors a circumstance "without . . . import." 4 In both cases it is the final balance sheet that counts.

Another example of the pervasiveness of the utilitarian approach can be
found in the theologian Joseph Fletcher's very popular book, Situation
Ethics.5 In this book he avows himself a thoroughgoing utilitarian,6 and states

that it is simply incomprehensible to him how any other basis for an altruistic
ethic based on love of neighbor can be rational, free from inexplicable arbitrariness, 7 free from what Bentham called "ipse dixitism." For Fletcher the
sole rational principle can only be the greatest good of the greatest number,
and he is most emphatic in stating that therefore particular decisions can
only ultimately be referred to this principle, this "optimific calculus" (he
borrows that term from Bentham), and that any other principle for decision,
any other conception of right, any other stopping place can only be arbitrary.
Fletcher's argument is instructive because he is quite rigorous in drawing out
the implications of this position, and he sees that if the single sovereign
principle is the greatest happiness principle, then no subsidiary principle can
be anything but provisional. It is in the name of this utilitarianism that
Fletcher pours scorn on the "pilpulistn" of the rabbis who worried whether a
particular case fell under a specific prohibition rather than whether or not
it was conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.8 These
rabbis entangled themselves in the most tortured complexities in accomplishing with - it seems to Fletcher quite unnecessary - indirection, ends which
could be achieved quite easily and directly.
3

14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).

' Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, op. cit. supra
5 JOSEPH FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS (1966).
B

Id. at 95-97.

7 E.g., id. at 31-37, 59, 131-33.
8 Id. at 19.

note 1, at 1276.
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Given these views, one need not guess at what would be Fletcher's reaction to the series of cases recently discussed by David Daube in his book
Collaboration with Tyranny in Rabbinic Law.9 The cases there considered
deal with situations in which the leaders of a community are asked under
threat of dire consequences by an enemy to hand over an individual who.
will be killed. The rabbis, or some of them, make a distinction between the
case where a named individual is demanded and the case where the community itself is to choose the person to be handed over. In the latter case
some of the rabbis would see an absolute prohibition against betraying one
of their number into the hands of the enemy, and would rather see the whole
community destroyed. The analogy might also be drawn to those occupied
nations who refused to cooperate with the Nazi persecution of the Jews,
though threatened with severe consequences and with little hope of preventing
the final result.1 0
The relation of these cases to Dudley and Stevens is clear. If a net saving
of life is said to justify the sacrifice of life by one means, for instance by sealing
'off the engine room of the ship, why should it not in another case, where
moralists would see a direct killing? If it is the end that counts, why do the
judges in.Dudley and Stevens or the rabbis in Professor Daube's account worry
about the means? As Fletcher, puts it, "Only the ends justify the means,
nothing else." 1 1 And for utilitarianism the end is the greatest happiness of
the greatest number.
It will be my thesis, first, that utilitarianism which has found such favor
as a general moral theory is such an oversimplification of the human moral
situation that its avowed clarifications are purchased not only at the cost of
concrete conclusions which are sometimes so objectionable to our intuitive
moral sense that we are not at all inclined to take them seriously, but also
at the cost of a conceptual confusion about subjects such as means and end,
and acts and consequences. Indeed I would say that utilitarianism has failed
utterly to account satisfactorily for our intuitive sense of morality as it is expressed in absolute strictures against, for instance, murder, injustice, or
cruelty. 12 But the hold of utilitarianism is such that we maintain these intuitive principles, if we.do, with a certain embarrassment, as if we were not
being fully rational.
The oversimplification, amounting to fallacy, which I see in utilitarianism,
9 DAVID DAuDE, COLLAORATION wrr
TYRANNY IN RABBINIC LAw
See HANNAH ARENIYr, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM (1963).

(1965).

10

21 FLTCHE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 120.
12 This point is made forcefully in Elizabeth Anscombe, Modem Moral Philosophy, 33
PHILosopaY 1 (1958). It is appropriate to remark here that I have found the whole of
this paper richly suggestive and that it has stimulated much of the thought that lies behind
my paper.
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and which I believe entails these many unacceptable conclusions, I shall seek
to explicate by reference to the concept of action. My argument will sketch
a theory of action and of the relation of reason to action which seems to me
more adequately to account for human moral phenomena.
I shall then proceed to suggest how this concept of action, and of reason
as related to action, might be applied to the concrete problems of law and
morality which I have already mentioned
Dudley and Stevens, or the handing over of innocent persons to an enemy - and provide at least a framework
for analysis and judgment.
II
-

of utilitarianism which I wish to use- ultimately for no other
purpose than as a foil for the affirmative doctrine I propose - is the fullblooded hedonistic utilitarianism of Bentham.
I will acknowledge at once that there are few in philosophical circles who
maintain this full-blooded view, in part I suppose because of the very great
difficulties and incoherencies in that view. Rather it has passed over in a
more or less implicit form to others, lawyers, psychologists, political scientists,
theologians, where the philosophical critique has not yet quite caught up with
it. Bentham survives among philosophers largely in one of two forms. One
form is what is known as restricted utilitarianism, according to which it is
not individual acts but rules and practices which must be referred to the
principle of utility.' 3 The few survivors of pure Benthamism reject this revisionism - quite rightly, it seems to me - as being arbitrary,' 4 and indeed
it is urged only in order that utilitarianism yield results consonant with other
principles, notably that of justice, which are not utilitarian at all. In other
words the sovereign is - more or less surreptitiously - deposed at least as
sovereign by these revisionists. The other form of the felicific calculus popular
today is choice theory, which is a sophisticated mathematical tool for maximizing preferences, whatever they may be, in a given domain. With this
theory I have no quarrel; it is simply beside the point, as it does not even as utilitarianism does - purport to come to any substantive conclusions about
preferences. Preferences are taken as given. But, of course, a complete substantive moral theory must address itself to the substance of these preferences,
This utilitarianism does in its concepts of pleasure and pain.
It is the central tenet of hedonistic utilitarianism that every circumstance,
event, or condition is to be judged by its tendency to produce a state of affairs
THE VERSION

Is E.g., Roy F. Harrod, Utilitarianism Revised, 45 MIND (n.s.)

137 (1936).
C. Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, 6 PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
344 (1956); cf. C. D. Broad, On the Function of False Hypotheses in Ethics, 26 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS 377 (1916).
14
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experienced by human beings which is happiness or, more robustly and concretely, pleasure. 15 This central tenet may be analyzed to display two subsidiary and complementary propositions, both of the highest importance to
my thesis:
First, that what is significant about a circumstance, event, or condition
is its consequences, and thus as applied to human actions what is significant
and solely significant about them is their consequences. 16
Second, that the sole consequence of ultimate significance, as Bentham
puts it, the "sovereign" criterion, is an end state of pleasure, which is experienced by human persons.
It is against these two tenets - that acts dissolve into their consequences,
and that a single passively experienced state is the end of all choice and action
- that I shall argue and erect a competing theoretical structure.
III
proposition I wish to establish is that the single, determining end
of many actions and, I would suggest most significant ones, is not some separate, passively experienced state, but rather that among the ends and often
the sole end is the successful completion either of the action itself or of an
ordered set of actions of which a particular action is a member.1 7
The model of the Benthamic pleasure and pain is the itch and its relief.
Of course, Bentham enumerates a whole host of other pleasures - for instance,
the "pleasures of novelty," or the pleasures of skill. But, insofar as they are
all denominated pleasures, there is the clear implication that the connection
between the end state and the action productive of it is such that what counts
is the end state, while how it is produced is a matter of technology - what
counts is the relief of the itch, and whether this occurs spontaneously, by my
scratching, by taking a dru& or by someone else scratching my itch for me,
is not relevant to that point.
Now it is evident that even in Bentham's catalogue there are some items,.
like the pleasures of skill or curiosity,lS which do not fit this model easily. But
in Bentham's treatment the clear implication, and the one which accords
THE FIRST

16' JEEaMv BENTHAM, THE PIuNCIPLES OF MOALS AND LzoISLATION 1-2 (Hafner ed.,
SMART, AN OUTLINE OF A SYStEM OF UTILITARIAN ETHICS (1961).
16 BENTHAM, op. cit. supira note 15. This "consequentialism" is remarked and criticized

1948). For a modern statement see J. J. C.

in Anscombe, op. cit. supra note 12, and also in John Ladd, The Ethical Dimensions of the
Concept of Action, 62 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 633 (1965).
17 This point is made by CHARLES TAYLOR, THE EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOUR ch. 10
(1964). See also DAVID SCHWAYDER, THE STRATIFICATION OF BEHAVIOUR 159-64 (1965).
18 Cf. BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 15; Harrod, op. cit. supra note 13, at 33-35.

NATURAL LAW FORUM

best with the general direction of his work, is an implication made explicit
in the writings of both Hume' 9 and Freud, 20 that these pleasures are derivative from pleasures such as the pleasures of mastery, which in turn are compounded of pleasures of expectation of gratification to be attained and pains
averted. I say this implication accords best with the direction of Bentham's
work in that the very focus on the pleasures of this and that suggests a sensationalism as to which the cause of the pleasure is relevant simply as that,
the cause of a separate and sovereignly significant entity.
Now I suggest that on the contrary in most significant actions at least
an important if not the sole end is the action itself, and that to speak of the
pleasure of the action as if it were a separate entity existing outside of the
action is to mistake a metaphor for a reality. There are, to be sure, purely
passive pleasures, and to them the Benthamic model is well applied. But it
should be noted that these are not very important or very pervasive. In
general the pleasurable pursuits are activities or actions, and not passively
experienced sensations. The pleasures of food, drink, or sex, which are supposed to illustrate most cogently the hedonistic principle, pertain primarily
to activities, the structure, appreciation, and context of which make for the
pleasures they contain.
As one passes to less physical pleasures-the pleasures of amity, skill, and
novelty, to knowledge, art, or love-it becomes more apparent still that the
paradigm of the valued entity is not some passively experienced state but
a complexly structured action or set of actions. Knowledge, as something
enjoyed, for instance, quite clearly is either the active acquisition of knowledge,
its appreciation, or at least the rehearsing in the mind of the evidences and
interrelations of the knowledge.
Thus in general I would say that before pleasure, is action- in the
snse that what we seek, what we desire, what we are satisfied in attaining
is only rarely and unimportantly an end state separately identifiable as pleasure or a pleasure; it is rather the suc'cessful performance of certain actions
or sets of actions. If, then, there be a sovereign master, to use Bentham's term,
it is action. Moreover, action is the sovereign principle in another related
way: it determines and gives sense to such concepts as emotion, will, desire,
satisfaction, and indeed pleasure.
Desire is desire for an end to be attained; and if I am right about my
criticism of the pleasure-pain model, then it follows that what is desired is
the successful performance of various actions, be they acts of eating, of sex,
29 DAVID HuME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE bk. 2, pt. 3, § 10 (1739).
20 For a good discussion see WHITE, EOO AND REALITY IN PSYCHOANALYTIC

(Psychological Issues Monograph 11, 1963).
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of understanding, of friendship, or of worship. This desire may precede action,
but it can only be recognized as a desire for this or that, and what the desire

is cannot be identified without the concept of the object desired. Desire is
a palpable disposition to action. So also emotion may be seen as the appreciation of a relation - between an external object and our interests, our
interests being those things we desire to do. And pleasure itself, as a generic
term, is to be understood as the successful performance of what it is we do.
21
ThI was Aristotle's definition.

But these are complex issues requiring careful elaboration. For present
purposes I wish only to suggest their relation to my principal assertion, that
the central concept is that of action, that what we desire, need, take pleasure
and satisfaction in is primarily action. This centrality of action should, indeed,
be put still more forcefully: we are what we do. The same view which holds
that our ends, the things we value, are passively experienced end states, also
would see the unity and essence of the individual in this ultimately passive
recipient of sensations, it would locate the center of our individuality in the
flow of perceptions and sensations.2 2 It is my assertion that we are primarily
what we do, and secondarily what we are inclined to do, wish to do, and are
23
able to do.

Two consequences of this action-oriented view are, first, the changed
21
a
ARISTOTLE, NIcOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 7, 1154 . It should be evident that my
account draws on Aristotle's both directly and through his modern followers such as
Anscombe and Hampshire. For recent discussions see Brice Noel Fleming, On Intention, 73
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 301 (1964); ANTHONY KENNY, ACTION, EMOTION AND WILL chs.
1-6 (1963); Moreland Perkins, Emotion and Feeling, 75 PHILOSOPHICAL RviEw 139
(1966); DAVID SCHWAYDER, THE STATIFICATION OP BEHAVIOUR 165-71 (1965); CHARLES
TAYLOR, THE EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOUR chs. 2, 3, 10 (1964).
In some recent discussions, particularly those of Kenny and Taylor, much is made of the
argument that desires, emotions, pleasures, intentions, etc. are logically related to their
objects, whereas those against whom this argument is made are said to posit a causal relation. This contrast seems so sharp that it is comforting to make points in terms of it. Thus
the thesis of this paper might have been stated in terms of the distinction between ends
which are contingently or causally related to the acts which attain them and those
ends which are logically so related. Indeed this is a temptation to which I succumbed
in an earlier draft, when it was pointed out to me that, first, this seemingly crisp opposition may be a good deal less clear than it seems, and, second, that anything I want to say
can be said without recourse to what is at best a dubious distinction. Briefly, there does
indeed seem to be a question whether the relation between an antecedent and a consequent which can be specified by reference to laws or theories is less logical or more contingent than a relation between elements which is stated to be logical or to depend on
the definition of the terms, especially when the terms are as complex and open-ended as
those in question here. For discussions which show sensitivity to this issue, see Richard
Brandt and Jaegwon Kim, Wants as Explanations of Actions, 60 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
425 (1963); Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, 60 JOURNAL OF PHILosoPHy 685 (1963).
22 HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 1, pt. 4, § 6.
25 Although I would not attribute this view to them, I refer the reader at this point to
STUART HAMPSHIRE, THOUOHT AND ACTION (1959); Brian O'Shaughnessy, Observation
and the Will, 60 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 367 (1963).

NATURAL LAW FORUM
emphasis this view gives to questions of evaluation, and second, the changed
role that this view assigns to reason and rationality in relation to human action.

IV
IT SHOULD be fairly evident how it is that the view I put forward complicates the problem of evaluation: if there is some single end state which is
the touchstone of all value, then the question of evaluation is reduced to a
question which has no further reference to values, a technical question as it
were, a question of means only - how to maximize, either for one person 9r
in society, the persistence and intensity of this end state. This, of course, is
just how Bentham viewed the matter. To the extent that the ends of action,
however, can be conceived of only as the successful completion of the actions
themselves, then no single quantitative measure will be available. As there
are many sorts of actions, so there will be many ends, and since these ends
will not be commensurable by the single standard of the felicific calculus,
how are these various ends to be evaluated against each other, how are they
to be rationalized? This problem is difficult, indeed central, for it is the
attraction of utilitarianism that it appears to have an answer which is at
least in principle clear. Indeed the final picture I shall present, though I
hope far more true to life, will be fragmentary, partial, and developing. I
would attack this central problem by dealing first with the problem raised
by an action-oriented view of the relation of reason to action.
V
of reason to action in the classical utilitarian view is an easy
one: as Hume put it, reason is and can only be the slave of the passionsand for "passions" one can easily substitute pleasure and those things inclining
to it.24 Again, reason has a wholly technological significance - this is the
meaning of the slave metaphor; one might as well say, after all, that business judgment is the slave of profit. We have a single value, and the maximization of that value is then an inquiry into means alone, not into ends.
Now in the action-oriented view I propose here the role of reason is quite
a different one. There is no single end of all action, and therefore reason
cannot have so simple a role. But what is that role to be? Here recur with
me to my central concept of action - it is a notion of activity, of movement,
mental or physical, internal or external, and action is or may be directed at its
THE RELATION

24 For a most illuminating discussion and criticism of this dictum see J. D. Mabbott,
Reason and Desire, 28 PHILOSOPHY 113 (1953).
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own successful performance. Some clear examples are, on the intellectual

level, the acquisition or exercise of knowledge; on the aesthetic, the composition, performance, or comprehension of a piece of music; on the physical
level, the sexual act. More complex examples are acts of justice, acts of kindness, love, or friendship, acts of revenge or gratitude. In each case the
end of the activity, of the changes, gestures, behavior which are included
in the act, is at least the successful performance of the act itself.
Now what is the role of reason in this concept of action- is it that of a
slave to an extemally posited end? It might be, of course. Few if any of the
actions referred to above can simply be performed at will - circumstances
must be right, skills must be present, and reason, in Hume's sense, can certainly subserve to bring about such skills and circumstances. Moreover, many
if not all of such acts may be performed for some ulterior reason and not for
their own sake, and reason may be involved in the choice and guidance of
the act as a means to an end. But reason, in my view, has a further and altogether different role, and although utilitarians might acknowledge this role,
it plays no part in the development of their general moral theory. They do

not build on it. It is an account of this role that I proceed to develop.
Take an activity like the intellectual activity of solving a problem: there
are, to be sure, movements, gestures, behavior which constitute this activity.
These may be internal or mental, but whether one speaks aloud or to oneself

these gestures must be there. But surely no one would say that one performs
the action of solving a problem just by going through these gestures. Jonathan Bennett in his excellent recent book Rationality tells the story of
the horse which was believed by some to be able to add and subtract numbers, because it "answered" questions . . . by tapping the ground the
right number of times with its foot. It was then discovered on each
occasion, just as the series of taps reached the right number, the horse's
owner could be observed to hold his breath in honest anxiety .... 25
Now the horse in this story was not counting, although he performed all the
gestures appropriate to counting, gestures without which - in some form,
mental or overt- there could be no counting. The horse did not count, as
Bennett so well points out, because the gestures were not motivated by reason, by an understanding of the principles, of the argument, if you will, by
which these gestures lead to the solution of problems, by which they count
as counting. So also one can neither play chess nor win at chess - an instance
of an activity- merely by making correct chess moves, although, to be sure,
one must make those gestures to play. One must also understand the rules
25 JONATHAN

F.

BENNETT, RATIONALITY

40 (1964).
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of chess, the point of the game and the point of games; and these under-

standings, these principles or arguments, must motivate the gestures, lie behind
them, before one can be said to play chess. Consider an example from art.
One can hear the notes in a piece of music, but one cannot be said to hear
them as music unless he comprehends their relation to each other, their argument as it were. Finally, and most pertinently to the present purposes,
imagine an act of justice: for instance the restoration of unjustly acquired
property. One can take another's property and then - because one no longer
needs it or through inadvertence, or perhaps as a gift - return it to the owner.
But these are the gestures without the argument; the sense of justice involves
an understanding of the arguments of justice, and to make an act of restoration is not only to make the appropriate gestures but also to make them in
response to the principles of justice, as a result of following the argument of
justice. It might be said that for an act of restoration to be such an act, it
is as necessary to follow, however inchoately, the arguments of justice as it
is necessary for an act of mathematical calculation to follow the canons of
arithmetic, however inchoately.
Thus a rational action is an action which is performed not only according
to a principle or program which an outside observer can articulate, but an
action which is programmed or organized self-consciously in the sense that
the agent is in possession at least inchoately of the argument according to
which he organizes his behavior. To develop fully a theory of what it is that
differentiates rational action from instinctive actions - such as walking or
eating- would take us too far afield.2 6 I have used terms such as canons,
principles, score, argument to refer to the element to which the agent selfconsciously adverts in organizing his behavior into any particular instance
of rational action. These terms are, I know, at best suggestive metaphors,
and although I will not develop the full theory I would like to clarify the
meaning of this element of rational action.
In rational action the agent's behavior is organized by reference to a plan
which has as its content the organization of the behavior of an agent who
refers to it;27 that is his reference, not that of an outside observer. Moreover,
it is a further condition of the action's being a rational action that this plan
exhibit a minimal degree of coherence. That is why I have found the term
"argument" an apt one. Thus we will not have an instance of rational action
if there is a plan that states that gesture a is to be followed by gesture b, and
if furthermore the agent can be said to know of this plan and to have conSee, generally, SCHWAYDER, THE STRATIFICATION OF BEHAVIOUR pt. 2 passin (1965).
Compare the discussion in SCHWAYDER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 84-115 with that of
BENNETT, op. cit. supra note 25, at 86-93.
26
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suited it as he performed the specified gestures. The further element, which
is that of coherence, requires that there be a specifiable relation between the
parts of the plan, and that it be possible to articulate and defend that relation. Now that relation may be in the minimal case purely logical, so that
the solution of a problem in logic will consist of a number of steps, each of
which is related to the other by the canons of logic alone. Or in the playing
of some very simple game, the individual moves may unfold by the application of the rules of the game to the situation, these rules operating as might
the axioms of a proof. But the relation to the moves may be more complex,
as in a dance where there are preexisting standards of grace, and where other
dancers may interject different elements which dictate the appropriate response,
given the previous gestures and the accepted canons. Or the relation may
be more complex still, as in scientific inquiry, where the relations between the
steps are the canons of valid scientific truth, and the movements - which
may be purely mental movements - are dictated by the combination of those
canons and the emerging evidence. Thus, what is needed for rational action
is that the action be scored by an articulable plan, the steps of which exhibit
a certain coherent relationship to each other.
I would enter two caveats at this point. First, neither the premises nor
the laws of logic by which the plan of a rational action is a coherent plan
need be openly articulated by the agent. They are immanent in the sequence
of the plan. They come to the fore to the extent that incoherences, when they
become apparent, bring about a revision of the plan of action in order to
make it more coherent. And here too there need be no explicit reference to
the canons of logic or coherence; it suffices that the agent understand and
be able to make such a reference. Second, to the extent that premises for
a coherent plan may be chosen at random, the variety of rational activities
is infinite - this is the basis of play and of some forms of art. 2 8 Moreover,
instinctual activities and purely instrumental activities may be taken over by
reason, and each be invested with a self-contained coherence - hence the
art of dance, of love, of cooking. Thus we see reason seeking to involve more
and more of our activities, a constant turning of the instinctual and the instrumental to that which has in part a self-contained and a self-conscious coherence.
I have sought to show thus far that there are actions which need be
directed at no end other than their own successful performance. These acts
almost invariably consist of an integrated, ordered series of gestures, and it
is as much the maintenance of the order as the execution of the gestures
28

See, generally,
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which is required for the successful performance. Of these there is a further
subclass of acts which demand for their successful performance not only the
execution of an ordered series of gestures but also a self-conscious reference
to their own principle, the self-conscious reference to an argument. This T
call the class of rational actions. Reason may discover and' describe the principle of order in all such internally motivated actions, but only of the subclass of rational actions is it true that the agent himself must have some
awareness- explicit or inchoate- of the principles of his act.
For this whole class, the analysis of means and ends, an analysis which
utilitarians would impose quite universally, cannot offer the sole basis for
analysis. The act itself is not simply and invariably a means to some separately identifiable and attainable end, and the constituting gestures are not
related to the constituted act as means to end, but as a part to a whole. This
may be easy to miss as such actions are of course extended in time and are
constituted by a determinate commencement and termination, but to see
the commencement and continuation as means and the termination as an
end - which is what hedonistic utilitarianism and certain psychological
theories derived from it suggest- is as absurd as to see the opening bars
of a sonata as the means to the final chord as end, or to see winning as the
end and playing the game as a means to that end.
But it is in the subclass of rational actions that we. can see the special
inappositeness of the universal application of the means-end analysis. Reason,
calculation, planning, rationality in general, are not at all the means to some
external end. Rather, rationality, as we have seen, is the constituting form
of the action, the score which lends coherence to the performance. How
far then is reason from being the slave of the passions! How far, to put it in
our terms, is reason from being the slave of our dispositions to act! It is,
indeed, the form of some of our most persistent and human actions, and thus
of our most persistent if not urgent dispositions.
VI
THiS BRINcS us to the problem of evaluation, which, as I have indicated, is
considerably complicated. All I feel able to provide is something far less
compelling than the techniques which the felicific calculus would provide.
To those, indeed, who demand of a system of moral evaluation sharp and
simple imperatives - an instinct which utilitarianism sustains - I can offer
no help at all.
My argument depends on the proposition that we are what we do and
what we can do. This primacy of activity in defining what we are I shall
not argue further at this stage. I shall argue, first, that our capacity for
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*rational action, as it has been defined, is a necessary condition for the
recognition of an agent as a human person; second, that there is a subclass
of rational action, which I shall call moral action, which is a further necessary condition for this recognition. This assertion will be supported by my
arguing, third, that material moral principles such as justice are applications
of the capacity for moral action in certain specified circumstances. Fourth,
there is a systematic connection between the principles of justice and such
attitudes as respect and trust, and emotions such as love and friendship. Fifth,
an agent who did not have these attitudes and did not feel these emotions
would not be recognizable as a human agent. And sixth, whether one accepted
such principles as those of justice could only be shown in rational, moral actions
scored by those principles, so that evaluation becomes a matter of determining the principles on which one acts, and whether those principles are .the
principles of agents we would recognize as human. There are certain problems
connected with this line of argument which. I shall not consider: whether
other animals are capable of rational or moral action, and the issue about
which Professor Hillary Putnam has written so wittily, whether this capacity
29
should be attributed to robots.
Rational action has been defined as action which is scored by an articulable plan, the steps of which exhibit a certain coherent relationship to each
other.' This capacity for formulating coherent plans'of action and for acting
according to them is a necessary condition for an agent's being recognized as
'a human agent, since if an agent lacked this capacity he would be unable to
identify his own action as actions: he could formulate neither to himself nor to
others the rationale behind his discrete gestures and movements. He would
have no sense of their unity as actions - which is not to say an outsider
could not hypothesize such a unity as an external explanatory hypothesis
.about the behavior. So also such an agent would lack a sense of the rational

unity inherent in other agents' actions: having no conception of his own
actions he could have none of those of others. I think it is sufficient to assert

that an agent which lacked any conception either of the coherence of his own
behavior or of the coherence of the behavior of human agents would be so
strange to us that we would decline to consider him human.30
It is a further necessary condition for the recognition of an agent as a
human person that the, agent must demonstrate a capacity for a special
subclass of rational action which I shall call moral action. Thi& is the capacity
Hillary Putnam, Minds and Machines, in DimENSIONS OF MIND 138 (Sidney Hook,
ed., 1961).
80 Although I hesitate to attribute this argument to him, I was at least started thinking
along these lines by Stanley Cavell, The Claim to Rationality ch. 8 (unpublished doctoral
dissertation in Harvard College Library, June 1961).
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to score one's actions not only by a principle of reason but by a principle of
reason which takes as a premise or system of premises the perception of other
human persons as having similar capacities, desires, ends, and needs to one's
own. This premise is at the foundation of much of what we call morality. 3 '
In the scheme of my argument I take moral action to be a further development of rational action, a more complete and pervasive expression of that
capacity. It is a more complete expression of rationality because the perception of essential similarity or equality in entering into the argument or score
of moral actions demands of that argument that the perceived equality of
persons not be overridden by arbitrary inequalities. 3 2 Now it might be
objected that if the agent in plotting the fullest satisfaction of some complex
desire at the expense of a fellow human being takes into account his fellow's
similarity to himself and thereby, say, succeeds in trapping him where he
might otherwise have failed, then here too the perception of the similarity of
persons has entered into the argument of his action. But we would certainly
not call his action moral. The answer to this objection is that the fact of
similarity or equality has not, in the asserted counterexample, become a premise
of the argument, since the agent, though recognizing the equality, still takes
as his overriding premise a proposition which is inconsistent with this, that
the satisfaction of his desires is to be accorded a different weight from those
of his victim. Yet there is no premise which justifies such a preference. The
closest would be the principle that each agent is justified in preferring his
own desires. But the agent does not assert that in trapping his victim. It is
only in principles which give equal value to all equal agents that reason is
fully instantiated.
This perception of oneself as an agent equal to other agents gives rise
to the constraints of morality, which are expressed by our recognition of the
equal rights of others. This perception of equality, if it is to enter into the
argument of our actions, can only do so in the form of the concept of equal
right and the principles which derive from it. Roughly this is the concept
that in acting we must only do so on a principle which leaves an equal scope
to others to act. 3 3 Otherwise we would all be doomed- whenever there is
a danger that in acting we must impinge on others - to inaction or a devouring egocentricity. He who would interact with others and score that interaction in part by the perception of their common humanity must derive from
that common humanity principles which allow the fullest equal scope for
the action of all human agents in the interaction. As in the general case of
31 This account is, of course, essentially Kantian.
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rational action, there need be in moral action no explicit reference to the
perception of equality, of common humanity, nor of the principle of equal
rights which expresss that perception in action; it is only necessary that the
sense and coherence of the action performed depend on an argument which
assumes such common and equal humanity.
The capacity and disposition for moral action, that is, the capacity
to score one's actions on the assumption of common equal humanity, I
84
assert to be a necessary condition of recognizing an agent as human.
That this is so can be seen by imagining an agent who lacks this capacity.
Let us suppose he is capable of rational action, that he sees that other
agents are capable of rational and of moral actions (as I have defined
this term) and that they have instinctual ends similar to his own, but this
moral monster (for that is what he would be) cannot understand at all how
the fact of those capacities and ends in others imposes any constraints on his
actions except perhaps as providing him with information so as better to
exploit others. We would then imagine a rational agent for whom the humanity of others never provided a premise in the arguments of his actions except as a basis for exploitation. Such an agent would have no conception
of the rights of others, for - as I have argued - that conception derives
from the adoption of common humanity as a premise for one's actions.
And having no conception of the rights of others he could have no conception of his own rights. But an agent incapable of any conception of the
rights of others or of his own rights would be so strange to us, and the forms
of his interactions with us would be so alien and terrifying, that once again
we could not recognize such an agent as human. Thus the capacity for moral
action is a necessary condition for the recognition of humanity in an agent.3 5
VII

strayed a long way from utilitarianism, from specific moral judgments, from issues of means and ends and consequences in moral and legal
judgments. What I have presented has been a sketch of a theory of action,
of the subclass rational action, and sub-subclass of moral actions. I have
also sought to indicate the relation between reason and action and how that
relation yields a basis for evaluation in terms of the capacities for action
which are necessary to the recognition of a person as a human being like
ourselves. I now propose to return to the more concrete issues by applying
WE HAVE
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this theoretical framework to problems raised by specific acts of justice. and
particularly the problems raised at the beginning of this paper -- the direct
killing of an innocent person, i.e., the Dudley and Stevens case; and the betrayal by a community under duress of innocent persons into the hands of an
enemy, i.e., the case pondered by the ancient rabbis and raised again during
the Nazi persecutions.
In each of the examples there are two choices open. One of these choices
(refusing to render up the hostage person or hostage peoples or refusing to
kill and eat one of your fellows) is likely to lead to a net loss of life, yet it
is also the choice which seems the path of the higher moral virtue, which corresponds to our intuitive sense of justice in the face of the very greatest temptations. The utilitarian would quite probably urge the other alternative, the
nonheroic one, which would effect a net saving of life. Indeed the utilitarian
- with one qualification which I shall mention presently - would consider
the course-of conduct leading to a net saving of life the only rational and
therefore the only moral course, and would have to condemn the one which
our intuitive sense might incline us to praise, if not to demand.
In what follows I will try to draw out, by reference to the argument
already made, a little bit better what it is that leads to our intuitive judgment
that the heroic course is the better course in these situations; more specifically,
that intuition would assign the killing or surrender of an unwilling and inn6cent victim or hostage to the category of injustice.
In relying on our intuitive sense of the right course in these moral
dilemmas and on the common notion of justice I have not justified that
intuitive sense or vindicated the claims of the common notion of justice against
those of utilitarianism. The utilitarian, after all, offers a critique of common
sense morality and of the overriding claims of justice.3 6 To meet this critique
I must recur to the concept of moral action. Instead of measuring the choices
by the felicific calculus I would ask which alternative in these dilemmas is an
instance of moral action, which would be the choice of the agent who scored
his action by the premise of the common humanity of the persons involved.
The answer in terms of the view I put forward is necessarily complicated, and I shall certainly not attempt a formal derivation here. Indeed in
order even to sketch out how the concept of rational, moral action leads to
a solution in accordance with the intuitive sense of justice it is necessary to
give now a fuller account of the concept of moral action. Moral action is all
rational action which takes as its premise what I have called the perception
of common humanity. In speaking of rational action I spoke of the intrusiveness of reason, of the tendency of rational agents to score more and
36
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more of their actions by principles of reason, to lend coherence and self-containment to the instinctual and the instrumental. This same intrusiveness
of reason is present in the area of moral action. For I would not have the
premise of common humanity viewed simply as a negative, as a constraint
imposed upon action. After all, were the principle simply a negative one it
would be satisfied by inaction with respect to others, by passivity or suicide.
But moral action is an instance of activity, of assertion, of self-definition
through action. The correct emphasis must bring out the creative and the
inventive in moral action, in that the forms and premises of moral action
too can take over more or less of the instrumental and the instinctive, can
invent new forms of actions scored according to the rational principles of
moral action, and can invade, more or less completely, the amoral, that is,
the instrumental and instinctive.
This intrusiveness and creativity of reason can be seen along the whole
spectrum of sociability. Interaction with other persons is both a necessary
instrument to the fulfillment of many of our most basic instinctual needs
food, shelter, defense - and a recognized part of our common animal instinctual apparatus, whether in the form of the herd instinct, or in the more exclusive forms of the maternal and the sexual instincts. In moral action, reason
has invested these forms of interaction with a score or argument based upon
the premise of common humanity. Thus in our forms of social organization
we display acceptance of this premise by limiting even the common defense
against hunger, the elements, and enenuci to fcns which are compatible with
the premise of common humanity. Thus these pursuits, which might have
been referred entirely to ends outside of themselves, become incorporated
in actions which are scored by a principle of reason which recognizes not only
the common needs of all but also the common humanity of all participants
in the action. The concept of justice is primarily concerned with the forms
which this recognition of common humanity takes, viewed as a limitation
upon the pursuit of other ends.3? As such it is something of an abstraction,
emphasizing a negative aspect of the matter. But if we keep in mind the
total context this will not mislead us.
This principle of interaction in social enterprises is, furthermore, intimately connected with a family of other concepts: persons working together
according to the premise of common humanity display a sense. of justice or a
sense of fairness in their dealings with one another.3 8 Further, as they display
this sense of justice they will also display attitudes of respect and trust. And
these attitudes of respect and trust are the indispensable conditions of feelings
37 See KANT, op. cit. supra note 33.
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of love and friendship. On the basis of these feelings, which incorporate the
rational principle of moral action and the instinctive needs for closeness to
fellow beings, more elaborate and self-contained social forms still evolve, in
which the very sharing of activity is itself an end, this sharing being always on
the basis of mutual respect. Most instances of higher civilization are examples
of this: drama, music, the fellowship of scholars in intellectual pursuits. But
in fact this aspect of moral activity reaches back into the more instrumental
activities, so that not only is there justice but also friendship in such complex
forms as the army and the factory.
What is true of action in the sphere of complex, organized social activity
is true also in the context of more or less personal interactions. Friendship
does not necessarily require a full social context - it may take place on a
desert island or on a lifeboat in midocean. But it does require the concepts
of trust and of respect, and so the acceptance of the premise of common
humanity in the activities which the concept of friendship scores. So also reason
and morality can take over the instinctual sexual relation, incorporating it
into larger morally defined contexts of action and investing it with forms,
feelings, and entailments expressive of the arguments of love, friendship, and
respect, which in turn derive from the premise of common humanity. 39
Thus morality is essentially a type of rational action, and it is an action
which is performed in a variety of contexts in which it gives rise to the concepts of justice, fairness, respect, trust, friendship, and love.
Applying this to our examples, it should be clearer what is the rational
basis of the intuitive judgments that the killing of the innocent cabin boy or
the turning over of an innocent hostage to an enemy are acts violative of
justice and therefore violative of morality. For morality is exemplified and
exhibited in actions which have the perception of common humanity as their
premise. The concrete cases, the lifeboat as well as the threatened community,
present complex contexts in which the situation and its possibilities for action
are defined by the forms which morality assumes in those contexts. Not only
do these cases occur in contexts where rational and moral acts of friendship
and love are possible, but where justice too requires the pursuit of our interests only insofar as the constraints of the premise of common humanity
permit.4 0 In each case the question will not be merely what act will effect a
net saving of life, but what act in that context is an expression of the respect
for common humanity, as love, friendship, mutual respect, and loyalty are
expressions. And if the dilemma is put in those terms, the argument for the
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heroic course as the better course becomes far more plausible. For defending
against the common enemy without turning over the hostages, or supporting
each other in the ordeal of the lifeboat without killing an innocent and unwilling fellow seems at least prima facie the best expression of justice, and
therefore of friendship, love and respect and, more generally, of morality.
If this account makes the heroic course also at least plausible as the better
course, the question might still be asked whether I have given a reason for
following it, in the sense of having shown that there is an obligation to follow
it. To this question the only answer I can venture is that if we Would be
moral men then we must act according to the principles of morality; and if
we would show a sense of justice, love, friendship, trust and respect, then we
must score our actions by morality in the appropriate contexts. And the sanction is at least this: if we failed utterly to express these feelings and attitudes,
to act according to these principles - in short, if we failed utterly to be moral
we would not be recognizable as men and could not expect to be treated
as such.
VIII
I HrvE suggested - and no more than suggested - how the view I put forward of action as the touchstone of morality might provide a solution to concrete moral problems which is consistent with our intuitive moral sense and
opposed to the solution which utilitarianism would demand. I would like to
consider an objection which might be raised on behalf of utilitarianism which
would deny that my general view leads to different conclusions in these
specific cases.
Might it not be said after all that the perception of the importance of an
organized community as the scene of human activity of the highest order
of rationality justifies the sacrifice of the single individual, that the victim
himself should approve the sacrifice? And further, for the shipwreck case,
might it not be said that since life is necessary to sustain rational activity or
any other kind of activity, the utilitarian response to that case too is the correct response?
This very plausibe argument commits a subtle fallacy. For the community to persist, its members must, of course, survive, and the conditions of
their cooperation must continue to obtain; but the community, as an instance
of rational activity, is present in that activity and not simply in the persons
and circumstances that make it possible. Thus, in my example, the act -of
justice would be the most intense possible expression of the principle of community. In a real sese, then, the community would be more severely
jeopardized by yielding to the urgings of the enemy and committing an act
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of injustice. And this is but a further instance of the general point that what
one is - whether as a person or a collectivity - depends on what one does.
The fallacy is instructive because it points out a further contrast to utilitarianism, in which survival and therefore the factors of life and death take
on a precise but intuitively bizarre significance. 4 1 Since value consists for the
utilitarian in the maximization of the single end state, pleasure, individual
survival is relevant only insofar as the individual is a possible locus for the
experience of that end state, and his survival is justified at any particular
moment only insofar as the discounted expectation of pleasure the individual
will both cause and experience exceeds the pain. Hence Wechsler and
Michael's confident solution to the problem of Regina v. Dudley and Stevens
set out at the beginning of this paper. But we all suspect that this calculus
is both incoherent and wrong. Why we reject it may be clearer now from
the example I have given. What we survive as is more important than
whether we survive in the simple sense of physical persistence; and thus too,
since we must all die, it has always seemed important to those who have lived
to the fullest extent of their human capacities that somehow this feature of
life be significantly incorporated into a rationally principled action or series
of actions. To recur to the musical metaphor, the fact that the music must
stop is in any finished composition drawn into the very argument and structure of the piece that is played - it is not just an arbitrary external circumstance to be postponed or hastened, depending on how things are going.
Lest it be thought that I am referring to occasional heroics or even melodramatics, I should say that the point I am making here, the contrast I am
drawing to utilitarianism, seems to me to be the basis for the moral and legal
judgment that killing to save life is murder or not depending not simply on
the final balance sheet of lives saved and lives lost, but also on how the act
was done, how the lives were saved. In summary form, if lives are saved
unjustly then this may be murder, no matter what the score. This was the
judgment of the court in Dudley and Stevens, a judgment which Wechsler
and Michael reject in the name of utilitarianism. Moreover, if there is no
injustice, then let the final balance sheet be never so lethal, there is no act of
murder.
In the light of these remarks perhaps we can see the sense behind the
seemingly hairsplitting distinctions the rabbinical doctors suggest between the
case where an enemy state demands an individual and where a robber band
makes the demand, for in.the former case, as Professor Daube points out, it
is possible that the named individual has committed some crime for which
41
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the enemy state is entitled to punish him, 418 and where there is no larger community of states which determines how fugitives from due punishment are
to be captured a bellicose threat is not such an outrage. The same argument
relates to the demand for a named individual as opposed to the demand
for an unnamed hostage who is to be chosen by the threatened community.

For even where it is quite clear that the victim is to be rendered up for arbitrary murder there is a deeper perversion of the machinery of the state (which
is the exemplification of the bonds of community of its members) in the case
where not only does the community push the victim out of doors, as it were,
abandoning him to a fate which it did not create, but participates in the killing in the active way of actually using its processes to choose a victim. The
distinction, indeed, is closely related to the distinction between bringing about
a result by action and bringing it about by a failure to act. This too is a distinction which utilitarians reject, 4 2 but which our intuitive moral sense tells
us is of the highest importance. Where the community chooses the victim its
involvement in the crime is more active, the crime becomes in part its action.
If we feel the distinction between the two cases is inadequate, may I suggest
that this is not because, as the utilitarians might argue, there is the same loss
of life in both cases, but rather because, though the community's participation
in the crime is less active in the former case where a named person is involved,
it still seems active enough. 4 3 It is interesting to note, incidentally, that even
the most rigorous doctors would not have objected to an attempt to persuade
the victim to give himself up.
In the case of Dudley and Stevens too the question is not simply the one
of numerical survival but of the quality of the act by which survival is purchased. What are the premises of the argument, what are the principles of
an act which has as its direct and immediate object the death of an unwilling
victim with the end in view that others may live? (I leave out of account the
gruesome way in which the death enabled the others to survive.) Certainly
they are not compatible with the arguments of mutual respect and friendship,
since the killers say to their victim by their act that his unwillingness to die at
this time and at their hands must be subordinated to their wish to live, that
his life was worth less than theirs, that his right to determine how he shall
op. cit. supra note 9, at 21.
Op. cit. supra note 15, at 70-72; Wechsler and Michael, supra note 1, at
724-35, 751 n. 175.
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live and for what he shall die must be subordinated to their determination
to live longer, and for the reason alone that they are part of a majority who
would survive. Now I will not go into the formal demonstration of why a
principle such as this is incompatible with a morality based on mutual respect
for the moral personality of all persons, and thus why it cannot accord with
justice. I will rest content with the assertion that respect, friendship, trust,
loyalty or love could not be exhibited in the actions of persons who adopted
such a principle for their actions. And what would be the conclusion if the
defendants had allowed their victim to die naturally, or if they had all agreed
to some procedure where lots would be thrown, or if the victim had volunteered for the sacrifice? If one feels, as I do, that the issue at least becomes
harder in these cases, I suggest that this is because, though the net saving of
life is the same, the quality and principle of the act may be quite different.
Before leaving these examples I should deal with a utilitarian objection
which might be called the subjectivization defense. The utilitarian might
object that if I seem to make my case against him by the use of examples
involving the breach of principles such as mutual trust and respect it is because I take too simple a view of his position, for the utilitarian is willing to
take everything into account, even the effect on the agent and on the whole
future of the human race of outraging sentiments of loyalty and mutual respect.44 If these sentiments are socially useful, and if in effecting-a net saving
of life they are to some extent undermined, why that too must be taken into
account and may well tip the scales. But this seemingly plausible response is
no answer at all, for these sentiments of loyalty, respect, love, and trust are not
simply sentiments but, as I have been arguing, principles of action which are
quite incompatible with the utilitarian point of view. Of course the utilitarian
is free to treat these principles simply as data about the people whom he would
manipulate, but in so doing he must deny their validity and so undermine
them at least as his principles. He cannot, in short, be a person who respects, trusts, and is loyal to his fellow men unless he views these principles
as principles, and then he cannot just add them into his utilitarian calculus
simply as factors.
Ix
point I would make is a caveat. Utilitarianism is a comprehensive
philosophy. In principle it holds all the answers, and whatever difficulties
there may be are difficulties about the facts and their consequences. If such
THE LAST
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a view is stiflingly rationalistic, how much more so must my proposal seem,

given the more intimate role assigned to reason in it. But this is a mistake.
I have spoken of reason organizing, providing the principle for actions. Also
I have spoken of cases where the external facts are such that some action
is almost inevitable, and any action involves a crucial choice among principles.
But I do not think that this is the usual condition of our lives. Often inaction
will involve no particular principle of reason, and furthermore the situations
in which the most crucial principles become relevant are not all situations
into which we have deliberately thrust ourselves; we may simply have drifted
into them or have them thrust upon us. Thus the system I have in mind is
indeed a good bit more fragmentary than that which utilitarianism offers. It
is a picture of life in which circumstances or our own doing may throw up
certain crucial occasions for action when what we are is severely tested; it
is also a picture where we invent numerous occasions for action, scoring the
actions according to principles that may be more or less coherent with each
other from occasion to occasion. And finally it is a picture of a life where
we invest, showing more or less ingenuity and creativity, the necessary, the
instrumental, and the instinctive actions of our life with the forms and elaborations of reason. It is a picture made up of work, play, art, much idleness and
tedium, and a few moral crises. It is in short a rather fragmentary and discontinuous picture, presenting none of the smooth relentlessness of the constantly maximizing utilitarian man's life.
To be sure, some of us tend to organize larger and larger chunks of our
lives into coherent wholes. Some of us tend to make into integrated actions,
ordered by a single internal principle, large segments of life and conduct,
which for others remain discrete and fragmented. And there is a tendency
in reason to organize more and more, to take the fragmented and incoherent and make it part of ever larger wholes. But this is a matter of more
or less, and I have not yet met the man who has succeeded in incorporating

into one all-inclusive, coherent action the various elements, the various dis45
crete actions of his whole life.
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